Joseph Agostini v. Piper Aircraft Corp by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-5-2013 
Joseph Agostini v. Piper Aircraft Corp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Joseph Agostini v. Piper Aircraft Corp" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 153. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/153 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
      PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






JOSEPH L. AGOSTINI,  
Individually and as co-executor of the estate of Jordyn 
Agostini, Deceased;  
SUELLEN AGOSTINI,  
Individually and as co-executor of the estate of Jordyn 
Agostini, Deceased;  
DOUGLAS J. HENEGAR,  
Individually and as natural father of Kyle Henegar, Deceased;  
SHARON K. HENEGAR,  
Individually and as administratrix of the estate of Kyle 
Henegar, Deceased; 
DOUGLAS J. HENEGAR, 
Individually and as natural father of Kristopher Henegar, 
Deceased; 
SHARON K. HENEGAR, 





PIPER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION; AVSTAR FUEL 
SYSTEMS;  
LYCOMING, a/k/a Lycoming Engines,  
a/k/a Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division;  
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AVCO CORPORATION; TEXTRON, INC.; DUKES 
AEROSPACE, INC.;  
FLORIDA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY; F.I.T. 
AVIATION, LLC 
 
             Avco Corporation and Textron, Inc., 
                                    Appellants 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 02-11-cv-07172 
District Judge: The Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
 
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 5, 2013) 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.   
This motion to dismiss requires us to consider whether 
we have jurisdiction to review a district court’s denial of a 
motion for reconsideration when the order to be reconsidered 
is a remand to state court for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that 
although the District Court had jurisdiction to rule on the 
motion to reconsider the remand order in this particular 
instance, this Court has no jurisdiction to review the District 
Court’s ruling on the motion for reconsideration.  







 On November 11, 2010, an airplane crashed in West 
Palm Beach, Florida, resulting in the death of the pilot and 
three passengers.  Personal representatives for the estates of 
the deceased pilot and two deceased passengers (collectively, 
the “plaintiffs”) filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Philadelphia County in November 2011, asserting state law 
claims against Textron, Inc., AVCO Corporation, and other 
corporate entities (collectively, the “defendants”).  Textron 
removed the case to the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, 
asserting diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332.  The plaintiffs moved to remand the matter to state 
court, arguing that AVCO is a citizen of Pennsylvania, and 
therefore not diverse from all plaintiffs. 
 
 Based on the documents submitted by the plaintiffs, 
the District Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion on February 
29, 2012 and ordered that the case be remanded to 
Pennsylvania state court.  AVCO moved for reconsideration 
of the remand order on March 13, 2012, arguing that the 
District Court improperly granted the motion to remand on 
the basis of unsubstantiated argument, unauthenticated 
documents, and facts outside the record that had not been 
established by affidavit or testimony.  Citing the standard 
governing motions for reconsideration, the District Court 
determined that it had not clearly erred in granting the 
plaintiffs’ motion to remand and therefore denied AVCO’s 
motion for reconsideration on March 15, 2012.  A certified 
copy of the District Court’s February 29, 2012 remand order 
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was mailed to the state court on March 20, 2012.  The notice 




We begin by examining whether we have jurisdiction 
to consider this appeal.  28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) provides, in 
relevant part:  “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court 
from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or 
otherwise . . . .”  The plain text of § 1447(d) clearly bars our 
review of the District Court’s February 29, 2012 remand 
order.  Indeed, in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance 
Company, the United States Supreme Court underscored that 
“only remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c)” — 
namely, remand orders based on the lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, like the remand order here — “are immune from 
review under § 1447(d).”  517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996) 
(quotation marks omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).  
Textron and AVCO (together, the “Lycoming defendants”) 
acknowledge — as they must — that we do not have 
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s remand order.  
Nevertheless, the Lycoming defendants maintain that we have 
appellate jurisdiction over the District Court’s denial of the 
motion for reconsideration.  They argue that a remand order is 
distinct from a motion to reconsider a remand order, and that 
our review of the latter is not barred by § 1447(d).   
 
The plaintiffs respond that our review of the denial of 
the motion to reconsider the remand order would serve to 
circumvent the jurisdiction-stripping function of § 1447(d).  
That is, if we do not have jurisdiction to review a remand 
order itself, we cannot have jurisdiction to review a motion to 
reconsider a remand order.  The Lycoming defendants’ 
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valiant effort to escape this rather self-evident principle relies 
upon their observation that “in certain circumstances,” “an 
appellate court . . . may reach the merits of an unreviewable 
remand order.”  Brief of Lycoming Defendants in Opposition 
to Motion to Dismiss Appeal (“Defs. Br.”) 8.  Culling several 
cases wherein a remand order was held subject to appellate 
review, the Lycoming defendants maintain that “the existence 
of a severable or separable order on the merits of a collateral 
issue, as opposed to an order on subject matter jurisdiction, is 
appealable notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), and federal 
appellate courts have jurisdiction to review the order despite 
the fact that a case has been remanded to state court.”  Id. at 
9.  According to the Lycoming defendants, the motion to 
reconsider a remand order is just such a “collateral issue” 
over which we retain jurisdiction. 
 
We have indeed held in other contexts that federal 
courts may exercise jurisdiction over certain collateral issues 
even after a case has been remanded to state court.  For 
example, in Mints v. Education Testing Services, 99 F.3d 
1253 (3d Cir. 1996), we held that a district court had 
jurisdiction to grant attorneys’ fees associated with a motion 
to remand a matter to state court even after the district court 
had remanded the case to state court.  In Mints, we cited to 
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corporation, 496 U.S. 384 (1990), 
wherein the Supreme Court determined that even after a 
plaintiff voluntarily dismissed an action, a district court could 
impose sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
11.  Mints, 99 F.3d at 1258.  Although “recogniz[ing] that 
Cooter & Gell is distinguishable because it did not implicate 
the special jurisdictional problems presented when a case is 
remanded to a state court,” we nevertheless held that the 
award of attorneys’ fees — like the imposition of sanctions, 
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or the award of costs — “is collateral to the decision to 
remand and cannot affect the proceedings in the state court.”  
Id.   
 
Thus, our precedent establishes that federal courts may 
decide “collateral” issues after remand because such issues by 
definition “cannot affect” the progress of a case once it has 
been returned to state court.  This accords with the Cooter & 
Gell Court’s characterization of collateral issues as those for 
which “determination[s] may be made after the principal suit 
has been terminated.”  See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 396 
(identifying motions for costs or attorneys’ fees and motions 
to impose contempt sanctions as “collateral”).   
 
We hold that a motion to reconsider a remand order is 
not such a collateral issue.  To begin with, we explicitly noted 
in Mints that a motion to reconsider a remand order is distinct 
from a motion for attorneys’ fees, as far as the application of 
§ 1447(d) is concerned:   
 
While there is no doubt that under Hunt v. Acromed 
Corp., . . . , the district court should not have 
reconsidered the order of remand after the clerk of the 
district court sent the certified copy of the order to the 
clerk of the Superior Court, the principles underlying 
our opinion in that case are not applicable with respect 
to the . . . application [for attorneys’ fees].  
 
Mints, 99 F.3d at 1257. 
 
This interpretation of the collateral-issues exception is 
reinforced by the Supreme Court’s holding in City of Waco v. 
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 293 U.S. 140 
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(1934).  There, the Supreme Court held that the Court of 
Appeals retained jurisdiction to review an order by a district 
court to dismiss a party, even though the district court then 
remanded the case to state court because the party’s dismissal 
resulted in a lack of diversity jurisdiction.  Id. at 143.  The 
Lycoming defendants cite the Waco Court’s ruling as 
supportive of their position that this Court may entertain a 
post-remand challenge to a district court’s order.  However, in 
our view, the Supreme Court’s decision in Waco underscores 
that once a case has been remanded for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, that remand order cannot be undone.  
Significantly, the Waco Court explained that the appellate 
court’s “reversal [could] not affect the order of remand, but 
[would] at least, if the dismissal of the petitioner’s complaint 
was erroneous, remit the entire controversy, with the 
[dismissed company] still a party, to the state court for such 
further proceedings as may be in accordance with law.”  Id. at 
143-44.  The same cannot be said of the case before us now, 
as reversal of the District Court’s reconsideration order would 
necessarily affect the District Court’s decision to remand the 
case to state court.  Indeed, returning this matter to federal 
court from state court is precisely what the motion for 
reconsideration sought to do, and it is what the Lycoming 
defendants seek on appeal as well. 
 
The interpretation of Waco by other Courts of Appeals 
reinforces the distinction between the limited exception to 
§ 1447(d) and the rule the Lycoming defendants ask us to 
adopt in the instant case.  In particular, the Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit concluded that implementing the so-
called Waco exception requires:  (1) that the “purportedly 
reviewable order . . . have a conclusive effect upon the 
parties’ substantive rights,” including “a preclusive effect 
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upon the parties in subsequent proceedings”; and (2) that the 
reviewable decision is “able to be disaggregated from the 
remand order itself.”  Palmer v. City Nat’l Bank of West Va., 
498 F.3d 236, 240-41 (4th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks 
omitted).  Accordingly, the Palmer court held that it had 
jurisdiction to review dismissal of federal defendants who 
“were not subject to the remand order,” id. at 243, because 
they had ceased to be parties in the case.  The Palmer court 
noted the critical fact that, “[w]ere we to reverse the dismissal 
of the federal defendants, the remand order would not be 
subverted.”  Id. at 244 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
In the instant case, it is impossible to disaggregate the 
order denying reconsideration from the remand order itself, 
despite the Lycoming defendants’ insistence that the two 
orders are distinct and therefore permit application of the 
Waco exception as applied in Palmer.  The Lycoming 
defendants are correct that the District Court’s denial of the 
reconsideration motion “will have the preclusive effect of 
being functionally unreviewable in state court.”  Defs. Br. 9.  
But that is not the standard that this Court or the Palmer court 
— or, it appears, any Court of Appeals — applies when 
determining whether or not review of an order issued in a 
remanded case is permitted.  As with the motion for 
reconsideration filed before the District Court, the very 
purpose of this appeal is to subvert the remand order by 
convincing this Court that diversity jurisdiction does, indeed, 
exist.  Therefore, even if we were to adopt the procedure of 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for applying the Waco 
exception, we would find that the instant case fails the Palmer 
test because reversing the District Court’s denial of the 





We note that the “functionally unreviewable” standard 
proposed by the Lycoming defendants is confounding 
because it is the express effect of § 1447(d) to ensure that a 
remand order based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is 
unreviewable — in state court or elsewhere.  Our own 
jurisprudence on § 1447(d) makes this clear: 
 
The purpose of the rule is to prevent a 
party to a state lawsuit from using 
federal removal provisions and appeals 
as a tool to introduce substantial delay 
into a state action. . . . Without § 
1447(d), a party to a state action could 
remove the action to federal court, await 
remand, request reconsideration of the 
remand, appeal, request rehearing, and 
then file a petition for a writ of certiorari, 
all before being forced to return to state 
court several years later. . . . To avoid 
this delay, Congress has fashioned an 
exception to the general rule of review, 
and made a district court’s initial 
determination that removal was 
inappropriate a nonreviewable one.   
 
Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortg. Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 
156-57 (3d Cir. 1998).  Accordingly, we hold that we do not 
have jurisdiction to review an order denying a motion to 






 Whether or not the District Court itself had jurisdiction 
to reconsider the remand order depends upon establishing the 
moment at which jurisdiction was transferred from federal to 
state court.  According to our precedent, the mailing of a 
certified copy of the remand order to state court is the event 
that formally transfers jurisdiction from a district court within 
this Circuit to a state court.  Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. 
McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The general 
rule is that a district court loses jurisdiction over a case once 
it has completed the remand by sending a certified copy of the 
remand order to state court.”).1  In our view, the text of 28 
U.S.C. § 1447(c) establishes that jurisdiction remains with the 
district court until the jurisdiction-transferring event has 
occurred:  “[a] certified copy of the order of remand shall be 
mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court.  The State 
court may thereupon proceed with such case.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1447(c).
2
  Thus, in this case, the District Court had 
                                                 
1
 This Court decided Trans Penn Wax on a petition for writ of 
mandamus, not as an as-of-right appeal, because the remand 
order in that case was pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 — not 
§ 1447(c).  Trans Penn Wax, 50 F.3d at 227.  In Thermtron 
Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, the Supreme Court held that 
§ 1447(d) does not bar mandamus review of remand orders 
grounded in legal authority other than § 1447(c).  423 U.S. 
336, 345 (1976); see also James E. Pfander, Collateral 
Review of Remand Orders:  Reasserting the Supervisory Role 
of the Supreme Court, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 493, 495-96 (2011) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s expansion of as-of-right 
review through the collateral order doctrine). 
 
2
 This accords with the rule recognized by the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit as well.  Shapiro v. Logistec 
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jurisdiction to deny the defendants’ motion for 
reconsideration because, at the time when the District Court 
considered the motion for reconsideration, a certified copy of 
the remand order had not yet been mailed from the District 
Court Clerk to the state court.   
 
 Our holding does not trouble that general rule, which, 
in addition to being “premised on . . . the language of § 
1447(c) and (d),” is also grounded in “the need to establish a 
determinable jurisdictional event after which the state court 
can exercise control over the case without fear of further 
federal interference.”  Trans Penn Wax, 50 F.3d at 225.  Here, 
that determinable jurisdictional event occurred after the 
District Court denied the motion to reconsider its remand 
order and before the Lycoming defendants filed their notice 
of appeal.  Therefore, it was not until the certified copy of the 
remand order was mailed to state court that the mandate of 
                                                                                                             
USA, Inc., 412 F.3d 307, 312 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Section 
1447(c) . . . is not self-executing. . . . This provision creates 
legal significance in the mailing of a certified copy of the 
remand order in terms of determining the time at which the 
district court is divested of jurisdiction. . . . Thus, section 
1447(d) divests the district court of jurisdiction upon mailing 
of a remand order based on section 1447(c) grounds to state 
court.” (quotation marks omitted)).  But see In re Lowe, 102 
F.3d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Subsection 1447(d) provides 
only that a remand ‘order’ may not be reviewed; it does not 
condition reviewability on any other event.  Thus, the plain 
language of subsection (d) indicates that a court may not 
reconsider its decision to remand, as soon as it formalizes that 




§ 1447(c) was fulfilled, triggering § 1447(d).  At the moment 
of mailing — the jurisdictional event — the remand order 
became unreviewable “on appeal or otherwise.”  A district 
court that seeks to preserve the ability to reconsider remand 
orders issued under § 1447(c), in order to guard against the 
occasional error in assessing subject-matter jurisdiction, may 
wish to bear in mind that jurisdiction is not transferred until 
the Clerk mails a copy of the certified remand order to state 




 The plaintiffs request, finally, that we award them 
costs and counsel fees for responding to what they claim is a 
baseless appeal.  Because, until now, this Court had not 
conclusively settled the question of whether appellate review 
of a motion to reconsider a remand order is permissible, we 
hold that the appeal was not “utterly without basis in law or in 
fact” and, accordingly, an award of damages and costs 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 is 
unwarranted.  Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 943 F.2d 346, 347 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  Moreover, Rule 38 permits the award of “just 
damages and single or double costs to the appellee” “after a 
separately filed motion” has been made.  Fed. R. App. P. 38.  
The plaintiffs failed to file such a motion.  For these reasons, 
we will deny the award of fees and any damages to the 
plaintiffs under Rule 38.  However, we will order that costs 
be taxed against the Lycoming defendants, pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(a)(1). 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the plaintiffs’ 
motion to dismiss this appeal.  We will deny the request for 
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attorneys’ fees, costs, and damages pursuant to Rule 38, and 
will order that costs be taxed against the Lycoming 
defendants pursuant to Rule 39(a)(1). 
 
